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Abstract 
The pricing of sovereign credit risk is a necessary component of the financial architecture of the European 
Monetary Union. However, unnecessarily high and volatile risk premia on government bonds are currently 
preventing effective financial intermediation within the euro area, thereby inhibiting its economic recovery. 
Several proposals have been made on how these risk premia should be brought down, namely i) permanent 
pooling of funding through joint bond issuance, ii) temporary liquidity assistance through multilateral funds, 
iii) debt buybacks using multilateral funds, and iv) debt restructuring.  
This paper attempts to evaluate these four proposals. It argues that joint bond issuance will not achieve a 
meaningful reduction of liquidity premia in the sovereign bond market; these instruments would either create 
perverse incentives or accelerate the sovereign debt crisis for peripheral Europe. An institution to provide 
temporary liquidity assistance is a necessary addition to the institutional framework of EMU – there needs to 
be an EMF to complement the ECB. Debt buybacks using multilateral funds can be a very useful tool for 
solvent countries such as Spain; they can prevent an overshooting of risk premia that could turn a sovereign 
liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis. A quantitative assessment shows that debt buybacks at market prices are 
insufficient to correct Greece’s debt overhang, however. In the case of Greece, a voluntary exchange of existing 
government bonds into new obligations, complemented by a buyback option at a steep discount to face value, 
could restore sovereign creditworthiness and allow the private sector to regain market access at acceptable 
interest rates. In the absence of such an orderly and controlled reduction of public debt, highly indebted euro 
area governments will likely opt to restructure their sovereign debt unilaterally, if they fail to regain market 
access after several years. This could have unwelcome consequences for financial stability in the euro area, 
which should be avoided through a creative and cooperative approach to the problem. 
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1.  Sovereign risk premia are useful price 
signals within EMU 
Since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, 
many politicians and academics have called for 
forceful policy action to reverse the divergence of 
credit spreads within the euro area. For instance, 
Cohen (2010) argues that allowing Greece to fund 
itself at a risk-free rate would turn it into a 
solvent country again, while allowing risk premia 
to prevail in European financial markets would 
lead to self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises. Before 
evaluating the feasibility of policy proposals 
aimed at lowering risk premia in the euro area 
periphery, it is worth asking whether it is 
desirable to move back to the market state that 
prevailed in the years before October 2009. For 
close to a decade, there was almost no dispersion 
among the borrowing rates of governments in the 
euro area. Should politicians, central bankers or 
regulatory agencies strive to re-establish a market 
setting that would allow the Spanish or the Irish 
government to borrow at risk-free rates? 
To properly guide savings and investment 
decisions, only assets without credit risk should 
trade at a risk-free rate. This implies that financial 
markets regulation should only try to eliminate 
credit risk premia on euro area sovereign debt if 
euro area governments cannot default on their 
bonds. However, history shows that is clearly 
possible for European states to restructure their 
public debt, and economic theory suggests that 
the introduction of European Monetary Union 
has made sovereign defaults more likely.  
Throughout the centuries, countries have often 
defaulted on their public debt. From 1557 to 1882, 
Spain defaulted 13 times on its sovereign debt. 
During the 19th century, Portugal defaulted six 
times on central government obligations, and 
Greece defaulted four times (Reinhart et al., 2003). 
The UK restructured its government debt five 
times between 1749 and 1932, by unilaterally 
lowering the coupon rates. Between 1841 and 
1873, ten US states defaulted on their government 
debt, and three of those states repudiated their 
debts altogether. The US imposed a haircut of 
40% on federal government debt in 1933 by 
abrogating the gold clause (Reinhard and Rogoff, 
2010). Germany defaulted on its external public 
debt in 1931, and achieved a write-off of about 
50% in the London Debt Agreement of 1953 
(Guinnane 2004).  
Since fiat currencies gained prevalence, 
governments have often resorted to currency 
debasement through inflation and depreciation in 
order to lower the real value of their debt. This 
has allowed most OECD governments to avoid 
outright defaults in the last sixty years, and it has 
given rise to the belief that sovereign debt crises 
in advanced economies are a thing of the past. 
For the countries of the euro area, however, this is 
a misguided belief. By adopting the euro, 
European governments have voluntarily put 
themselves into the position of “Emerging 
Markets” issuers, and have subjected themselves 
to elevated default risk.  
In many Latin American, Eastern European and 
Asian countries, frequent use of the printing press 
to finance interest payments on government debt 
or the insistence on non-market exchange rates as 
a means of financial repression made it 
impossible for governments to borrow 
meaningful amounts in their own currencies. This 
contributed to the build-up of large amounts of 
foreign-currency denominated sovereign debt. 
The resulting currency mismatches on public 
sector balance sheets were the main cause of the 
wave of sovereign defaults that hit “Emerging 
Markets” since 1982 (Eichengreen et at. 2005, 
Goldstein and Turner 2004). In fact, it can be 
argued that the presence of sizable liabilities in a 
currency that the government cannot control is 
the defining characteristic of an “Emerging 
Market”. The presence of sizable liabilities 
indicates that the country is indeed a “market” 
and not shut off from the global economy, and 
the fact that these liabilities are denominated in a 
foreign currency means that the country will be 
subject to an elevated degree of macroeconomic 
volatility, which turns it into an unstable 
“Emerging Narket” rather than a stable and 
“advanced economy”, to use the IMF 
terminology.  
A country with largely foreign-currency 
denominated liabilities faced with a “sudden 
stop” of capital inflows will not be able to 
accommodate this balance of payment shock by 
letting its currency depreciate, as this would lead 
to an explosion of debt servicing costs on foreign-
currency denominated liabilities and trigger 
large-scale private and/or public sector defaults 
(Calvo et al., 2003). Instead, the country will 
typically have to tighten fiscal policy in the midst 
of a recession to demonstrate its ability and 
willingness to continue servicing its foreign debt, RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE EURO AREA | 3 
 
which will likely contribute to a severe economic 
downturn. This macroeconomic setting can lead 
to a self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling sovereign 
debt crisis.  
“Emerging markets” can therefore be defined as 
countries that are unable to run counter-cyclical 
fiscal and monetary policies because they rely on 
foreign-currency denominated debt. These 
counties regularly suffer from elevated 
macroeconomic volatility. In the good years of 
expanding global liquidity, they attract large 
capital inflows at low real interest rates and enjoy 
a credit-funded boom. In the bad years, when 
creditors suddenly retract, they find themselves 
deprived of fiscal and monetary policy options to 
smooth the decline in output and subject to high 
sovereign country risk premia, which choke the 
economy. Hausmann and Gavin (1996) found 
that the volatility of economic growth rates in 
Latin America has been more than twice as high 
as in industrial economies, and the volatility of 
private consumption growth nearly three times 
higher. Eichengreen et al. (2005) show that 
countries which face difficulty in borrowing in 
their own currency exhibit a larger degree of 
output fluctuations. Allen et al. (2002) argue that 
virtually all financial crises in ‘emerging markets’ 
over past decades have involved currency 
mismatches. Schnabel (2004) shows that the high 
level of foreign-currency denominated debt 
caused the banking crisis and the sovereign 
default of Germany in 1931. 
Policy-makers in Latin America, Eastern Europe 
and Asia have become increasingly aware of the 
inherent dangers of running liabilities in a 
currency they cannot control. Roughly ten years 
ago, they started to eliminate mismatches on 
public and private balance sheets by borrowing in 
their own currencies. As a result, countries such 
as Brazil, Turkey or Indonesia can probably no 
longer be qualified as ’emerging markets’ – they 
are now economies with high and relatively 
stable economic growth. For the first time in 
about 30 years, these countries have been able to 
increase fiscal stimulus, lower central bank rates 
and allow their currencies to depreciate during 
the financial crisis of 2008/2009 without running 
the risk of sovereign default. At the same time 
that emerging markets started to eliminate a 
major source of macroeconomic vulnerability, the 
governments of Ireland, Spain and Greece 
voluntarily entered the European Monetary 
Union and thereby relinquished the ability to 
borrow in a currency they can control. The result 
is elevated sovereign default risk for these 
countries.  
To illustrate this argument, it is useful to compare 
the fates of Spain and the United Kingdom. Each 
country went through a credit-driven real estate 
boom in the run-up to the current downturn. 
Once the bubble burst, economic output 
contracted, unemployment rose and the fiscal 
accounts slipped into a large deficit. According to 
the latest IMF projections, Spain will be running a 
fiscal deficit of 6.9% of GDP in 2011, and gross 
general government debt will rise to 70% of GDP. 
The UK, on the other hand, will be running a 
fiscal deficit of 8.1% of GDP this year, and public 
debt is expected to reach 82% of GDP (IMF 
2010c). In light of substantially better sovereign 
debt indicators in Spain, how can we explain that 
financial markets assign a probability of 19% to a 
sovereign default over the next five years, but 
only a probability of 5% that the UK will resort to 
public debt restructuring? The reason is that it is 
almost impossible for financial markets to 
provoke a sovereign default in the UK, while 
there is a distinct possibility of such an event in 
any euro area government. If financial markets 
suddenly decided to stop funding the UK 
government, then gilt yields would rise and the 
currency would depreciate. But the floating 
exchange rate regime implies that for every 
pound sterling that jittery investors exchange into 
foreign currency, a pound sterling will also be 
bought by other market participants. Money 
supply would remain constant, and the exodus 
from the government bond market would lead to 
an increase in bank deposits – as long as nominal 
interest rates are reasonably high and there are no 
doubts about bank solvency. Commercial banks 
would then lend to the government at short 
tenors, in the absence of safer alternatives, and 
there would be no sovereign credit event. Even in 
the extreme case of a system-wide bank run, the 
Bank of England could still lend to the 
government and thereby prevent a sovereign 
default. By and large, this is the reason why 
Brazil, with its floating exchange rate regime and 
limited stock of dollar-denominated debt, was 
able to avoid a sovereign default in 2002 
(Schwartsman, 2002). 
On the other hand, a sudden stop of market 
funding  can mechanically lead to a sovereign 
default in Spain or in any other country of the 
euro area. The fixed exchange rate implies that an 4 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
exodus of investors from the government bond 
market can lead to a contraction of domestic 
money supply, as investors allocate the proceeds 
of government bond sales to other countries of 
the euro area. In the absence of market funding, 
the government won’t be able to borrow from the 
central bank, as monetary financing of member 
states’ government expenditures is prohibited 
under Article 123 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
When the government then runs out of cash, it 
will default on its obligations in the same way an 
‘emerging market’ such as Argentina would have 
to default on its sovereign dollar bonds. Greece 
got fairly close to this situation in May 2010, 
when emergency funding from the IMF and other 
euro area countries arrived only two days before 
the redemption payment on a large government 
bond.  
Figure 1. Macroeconomic determinants of sovereign 
CDS spreads (basis points) 
 
Source: IMF (2010a), Figure 1.6.  
Note: This chart shows the result of a cross-sectional 
regression over the 5-year sovereign CDS spreads of 24 
countries. Estimates on the required fiscal adjustment are 
drawn from the IMF Fiscal Monitor, May 2010. Regression 
parameters (t-stats): CDS spread = -2.35 (-1.89) current 
account balance +4.45 (3.08) required fiscal adjustment  
+4.14 (4.93) BIS bank claims. Adjusted R² = 0.81.  
We have shown that by adopting the common 
currency, euro area governments have subjected 
themselves to a high degree of sovereign default 
risk. Financial markets regulation should foster 
the efficient pricing of this risk. This implies that 
measures to fully eliminate credit risk premia on 
euro area sovereign bonds are misguided, as long 
as they are not taken as part of an overall change 
of the constitutional setting of the euro area that 
would turn it from a federation of sovereign 
states into a single nation state.  
By and large, markets are now pricing relative 
sovereign default risk correctly. The results of a 
recent IMF study, reproduced in Figure 1, show 
that 81% of the cross-country variation in 
sovereign credit spreads can be explained by only 
three macroeconomic factors: the required fiscal 
adjustment to stabilize government debt, foreign 
bank claims on the public sector, and the current 
account position. Large primary deficits and 
strong reliance on foreign funding mean that 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland command elevated 
risk premia.  
This result raises the question of why markets 
failed to price sovereign credit risk adequately in 
the run-up to the current crisis. Unfortunately, 
regulatory policies prevented the market from 
doing its job in the decade from 1999 to 2009. 
Three factors contributed to this policy failure:  
i)  European bank regulation put a zero capital 
charge on all EU government debt. 
Specifically, the Capital Requirements 
Directive (EU 2006) states in Annex VI, Part 
1, point 1.2.4 that “exposures to Member 
States’ central governments and central 
banks denominated and funded in the 
domestic currency of that central government 
and central bank shall be assigned a risk 
weight of 0%.” This directive has been 
adopted into national law by all EU member 
states. It encouraged commercial banks to 
buy Greek government bonds at a relatively 
small spread over Euribor, fund them in the 
wholesale market at Euribor flat and earn an 
interest rate margin without any regulatory 
capital requirement. The return on equity of 
this carry trade was infinite, which made it 
very attractive to ignore any embedded tail 
risks. 
ii)  European regulation allowed investment 
funds to invest up to 35% of their net assets 
into bonds issued or guaranteed by the 
governments of any EU member state. This 
provision of Art. 22, par. 3 of the UCITS 
directive (EU, 1985) encouraged fund 
managers to overweight higher-yielding EU 
government debt, in defiance of prudent 
portfolio diversification.  RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE EURO AREA | 5 
 
iii)  The ECB failed to differentiate for sovereign 
credit risk in defining initial margins for its 
refinancing operations. 
In addition to these regulatory failures, rating 
agencies played an important role in facilitating 
large-scale lending to risky sovereign issuers in 
peripheral Europe. Against hefty fees from the 
issuers, these agencies were happy to defy basic 
economic logic and to assign AA ratings to the 
sovereign debt of countries that were running 
large and unsustainable twin deficits in their 
fiscal and current accounts under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. In this way, they invited 
investors to contribute to the credit boom.  
The resulting lack of dispersion among 
government borrowing rates has contributed to 
an unsustainable credit boom in the euro area 
periphery. Once the boom came to an end, many 
governments were left with a large debt burden 
and/or unsustainable fiscal trajectories. European 
sovereigns have defaulted on their debt in the 
past, and by replacing their domestic-currency 
denominated debt with euro-denominated debt, 
governments have put themselves into a situation 
where the market can actually force them into 
bankruptcy. These developments have increased 
the risk of sovereign defaults in Europe, and this 
c r e d i t  r i s k  i s  n o w  b e i n g  p r i c e d  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  
bond markets. Contrary to the proposals by 
Cohen (2010) and others, politicians, financial 
market regulators and central banks should not 
try to eliminate the pricing of sovereign credit 
risk, but rather reform financial market regulation 
in a way that strengthens warning signals from 
markets in good times. This, however, will be 
insufficient to deal with the current financial 
crisis the euro area.  
2.  The current level of sovereign risk 
premia is threatening financial stability 
Since the onset of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis in 
October 2009, European financial markets are to a 
large degree failing to fulfil their role in 
intermediating between savers and investors. 
Sovereign spreads of many countries in the euro 
area have risen rapidly, notably in Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal. Due to the strong linkages between 
sovereign creditworthiness and bank solvency, 
problems in the government bond market have 
spilled over to the banking sector. Once Greece’s 
government had lost market access in the spring 
of 2010, none of its commercial banks were able to 
fund themselves in the bond market any more. In 
Spain, rising sovereign spreads drove up risk 
premia on all of the country’s banks by 150 to 330 
basis points, and even institutions with strong 
international diversification such as BBVA and 
Santander were hit. The increase in marginal 
borrowing rates for commercial banks quickly fed 
through to a commensurate increase in the 
deposit rates these institutions have to pay in 
order to prevent customer withdrawals. The 
resulting rise in the overall liability costs of 
commercial banks in turn acts as a constraint on 
credit extensions, and increases lending rates for 
the non-financial sector of peripheral countries of 
the euro area.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average CDS 
spreads of liquid non-financial corporate 
borrowers with investment-grade ratings in Spain 
and Germany over the past eight years. The 
graph demonstrates that corporate issuers in both 
countries faced diminished market access during 
the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, and 
improving financial conditions following the G-
20 meeting in April 2009. Since early 2010, 
however, the Spanish corporate sector is facing 
rising borrowing costs due to contagion from the 
sovereign’s financing problems.  
Figure 2. Non-financial corporate CDS spreads in 
Germany and Spain (basis points) 
 
Sources: Markit, Bloomberg, Spinnaker Capital.  
Note: This chart shows simple averages of the risk premia on 
the nine Spanish issuers and the 30 German issuers that are 
included in the ITraxx Europe Main index.  6 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
Furthermore, financial markets are currently 
assigning a common risk premium on all euro 
area government bonds, regardless of the 
vulnerabilities of individual countries. It is a well-
documented phenomenon that the variation of 
sovereign risk premia over time can be attributed 
to such a common factor. In an early paper, 
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) demonstrated that 
“market sentiment” plays a dominant role in 
explaining changes in credit risk premia on 
‘emerging markets’ government bonds. 
Remolona et al. (2008) find that the cross-sectional 
variation in sovereign spreads can largely be 
explained by country-specific fundamental 
variables, while the overall level of risk premia is 
driven by a common factor related to investor 
risk appetite (as proxied, in their study, by the 
level of equity index volatility). Remolona et al. 
also find statistical evidence for the common 
pricing of sovereign debt within geographical 
regions, which is due to the fact that investors 
assign risk factors not only to countries, but also 
to continents. Figure 3 shows that financial 
markets are presently penalizing sovereign debt 
issued by all euro area governments with an 
elevated risk premium. The inability of policy-
makers to re-establish financial stability in the 
euro area has resulted in a collective punishment 
by markets. In sum, the sudden loss of market 
confidence in the ability of governments to 
service their debts is preventing effective financial 
intermediation between private savings and 
private investments in the euro area. This inhibits 
the economic recovery, and may lead to a self-
reinforcing spiral of weaker activity, lower tax 
revenues, and even greater doubts about 
sovereign creditworthiness. European policy-
makers should act to prevent a de-stabilising 
overshooting of markets. The following sections 
evaluate the main policy proposals that have been 
made to restore financial stability in the euro 
area, namely i) permanent pooling of funding 
through E-bonds, ii) temporary liquidity 
assistance through multilateral funds, iii) debt 
buybacks using multilateral funds, and iv) debt 
restructuring. 
 
Figure 3. Common regional factors in sovereign CDS spreads (basis points, log scale) 
 
Source: Standard Chartered (2011). Market data and ratings as of January 2011. 
3.  E-Bonds are not going to work 
Since the onset of the European sovereign debt 
crisis, many European academics and politicians 
have been calling for the issuance of “E-Bonds” 
that are collectively guaranteed by the 
governments of the euro area. These proposals 
differ in many important details: De Grauwe and 
Moesen (2009) suggest that euro area member 
states should be enabled to fund themselves 
through E-Bonds at the same marginal interest 
rate they pay on their national debt issues; 
Edmond Alphandéry (2010) argues that access to 
this financing facility should be granted only 
under strict fiscal and macroeconomic 
conditionality, etc. The most prominent concept 
for E-Bonds was developed by Jacques Delpla 
and Jakob von Weizsäcker (2010). This “Blue 
Bond Proposal” has become the basis of policy RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE EURO AREA | 7 
 
proposals for collective debt issuance put forward 
by Monti, Juncker, Tremonti and other politicians 
(see Juncker and Tremonti, 2010).  
Delpla and von Weizsäcker propose that euro 
area member states be allowed to issue sovereign 
debt of up to 60% of GDP jointly in the form of 
“Blue Bonds” that enjoy seniority over national 
debt and that carry a joint and several guarantee. 
Sovereign debt that exceeds this threshold would 
become a junior obligation of the state. These 
“Red Bonds” would continue to carry the 
individual credit risk of each member state. A 
country with payment difficulties would then opt 
for a selective default on the “Red Bonds” in the 
first step, while remaining current on the “Blue 
Bonds”. If the country’s resources turn out to be 
insufficient to service these senior obligations, 
then the guarantee on the “Blue Bonds” will be 
called and the other member states of the euro 
area would have to absorb bondholder losses.  
The proposal by Delpla and von Weizsäcker 
shows that the basic idea of E-Bonds is to split 
sovereign liabilities into senior and junior 
tranches. In a reduced form, a risky sovereign has 
the present value of future payments to creditors 
on the asset side of its balance sheet, and the 
present value of its debt on the liability side of its 
balance sheet. The idea is to split the liabilities on 
the sovereign’s balance sheet in two: senior “Blue 
Bonds” and junior member state debt. The 
Modigliani-Miller theorem suggest that, absent 
market distortions, the weighted average interest 
rate of the “Blue Bonds” and “Red Bonds” should 
be identical to the interest rate before the liability 
split, because there has been no change on the 
asset side of the balance sheet. In that case, there 
would be no merit to the “Blue Bond” proposal.  
To illustrate this point, we can consider the 
example of Portugal. The country will likely have 
accumulated gross general government debt (d) 
of 90% of GDP next year (IMF 2010b), and the 
current market yield on five-year Portuguese 
government bonds (r) is 7%. If we assume that the 
Portuguese government splits its government 
debt according to the proposal by Delpla and 
Weizsäcker, then it would be left with 60% of 
GDP in “Blue Bonds” (dB) and 30% of GDP in 
“Red Bonds” (dR). If we further assume that “Blue 
Bonds” would trade at the same level as bonds 
issued by the European Union under the EFSM, 
then five-year Portuguese “Blue Bonds” (rB) 
would yield 2.80%. The present value of 
payments made available to sovereign creditors 
does not change because of this liability split, 
which implies that we can derive the yield on 
five-year Portuguese “Red Bonds” (rR) from d · r 
= dB · rB +   dR · rR. Under current market 
parameters, risk-neutral investors that face no 
market distortions would therefore price five-
year Portuguese “Red Bonds” at 15.4%. It is clear 
that Portugal would not be able to access the 
primary market for “Red Bonds” at such a level.  
This example shows that implementing the “Blue 
Bond” proposal would immediately force most 
peripheral euro area countries into a partial 
sovereign default. However, the result relies on a 
number of simplifying assumptions. Under which 
circumstances would the liability split lower the 
weighted average borrowing costs of the 
sovereign to an extent that becomes attractive for 
issuers? 
Juncker and Tremonti (2010) believe that the 
elimination of liquidity premia would lower the 
weighted average borrowing costs of the 
sovereign. They argue that “the absence of well-
functioning secondary markets” is forcing 
investors to demand an elevated yield on 
sovereign bonds issued by peripheral countries of 
the euro area and that the introduction of E-
Bonds would eliminate the resulting sovereign 
spreads. It is reasonable to assume that higher 
liquidity would indeed lower the yield on “Blue 
Bonds”. The interest rate (r) on sovereign debt in 
the euro area has three basic components: risk-
free Eonia swaps (e), a credit spread (c) that 
compensates investors for the default risk of that 
sovereign, and a liquidity premium (l) that 
compensates investors for market volatility. In 
sum, r = e + c + l. The market quotes r and e, and 
we can derive the overall spread (c+l). Although c 
and  l are unobservable individually, we can 
assume that l is going to be greater than zero. 
Juncker and Tremonti argue that splitting 
sovereign liabilities into a large portion of ultra-
liquid “Blue Bonds” and a smaller portion of less 
liquid “Red Bonds” will reduce the overall 
liquidity premium on the stock of debt, and 
thereby lower borrowing costs. This may be the 
case, but the effect is likely to be very small. First, 
Juncker and Tremonti fail to mention that the 
liability split would not only lead to the issuance 
of “Blue Bonds” with low liquidity premium, but 
it would also leave the sovereign with “Red 
Bonds”, which would require an even higher 
liquidity premium. Second, the assumption that 8 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
the entire yield spread of European sovereign 
bonds over the risk-free rate can be attributed to 
liquidity premia is clearly false.  
Figure 4 shows the spread of ten-year Austrian 
government bonds over German government 
bonds with the same maturity. This spread is a 
good proxy for the pure liquidity component in 
sovereign spreads of euro area countries. It 
compares the funding cost of an issuer with 
prime rating that is tapping the most liquid bond 
market in Europe (Germany) with another issuer 
with prime rating that operates in a market with 
relatively small trade volumes (Austria). The 
figure shows that yield spreads of Austrian over 
German government bonds had almost 
disappeared before the onset of the financial 
crisis. The spread stood at 47 basis points in 
February 2011, slightly above the long-term 
average of 21 basis points. If the price of 
significantly lower liquidity is currently around 
50 basis points in yield premium for issuers with 
identical credit risk, then it follows that the yield 
spreads of government bonds issued by Belgium 
(120 basis points over Eonia), Spain (230 basis 
points over Eonia) or Portugal (430 basis points) 
can largely be attributed to credit risk, and not to 
liquidity premia. 
Figure 4. Liquidity premium on Austrian government bonds 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, author’s calculation. 2971 daily observations, median 6 bps, arithmetic average 21 bps. 
This illustration is confirmed by a large body of 
empirical research. A detailed study of liquidity 
premia in the European government bond market 
concludes that “yield spreads were significantly 
affected by liquidity premiums before the start of 
EMU [but] this liquidity effect largely vanished 
with EMU” (Bernoth et al. 2006). Using a different 
econometric technique, another study reaches the 
same conclusion: “Liquidity differences play at 
most a minor role, and this role appears to arise 
partly from their interaction with fundamental 
risk” (Pagano and von Thadden, 2004).  
We can conclude that a reduction in liquidity 
premia could lower the average funding costs of 
peripheral countries of the euro area by a small 
margin only, contrary to the assertions of Juncker 
and Tremonti (2010). Delpla and von Weizsäcker 
(2010) acknowledge this by assuming a liquidity 
premium of 30 basis points only. For most 
peripheral euro area countries, this small 
lowering of the overall funding costs would still 
leave them with double-digit market yields on 
“Red Bonds” and the risk of an immediate partial 
sovereign default. 
There is a second reason why a liability split 
could lower the weighted average borrowing 
costs of the sovereign: “Blue Bonds” would not 
only be senior claims against the member state, 
but they would also constitute joint and several 
liabilities of all euro area member states. This 
collective guarantee significantly reduces default 
risk on “Blue Bonds” due to the limited default 
correlation of the guarantors, and thereby lowers 
borrowing costs. Pooling part of the sovereign 
debt of euro area member states through the 
issuance of “Blue Bonds” has the advantage that RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE EURO AREA | 9 
 
these countries would re-gain access to a form of 
financing that remains immune to market seizure 
under most plausible scenarios. “Blue Bonds” 
would enjoy higher credit quality and possibly 
higher liquidity than German Bundesanleihen. If 
private investors were to sell “Blue Bonds” in a 
speculative attack on European bond markets and 
deposit the proceeds of these sales with banks, 
then these same funds would very likely be rein-
vested into short-term “Blue Bonds” by commer-
cial banks that are in need of safe assets to match 
their growing deposit base. Thereby, “Blue 
Bonds” would allow euro area governments to 
collectively reinstitute control over the currency 
in which their liabilities are denominated.  
However, the fact that the market won’t be able 
to enforce a default on “Blue Bonds” under most 
plausible scenarios does not imply that providing 
joint and several guarantees for these instruments 
carries no risk for the guarantors. Assuming that 
all euro area member states would continue to 
honour “Blue Bonds” of up to 60% of their GDP 
during an economic crisis requires a leap of faith. 
Euro area member states should be happy to 
grant seniority to such instruments ex ante, but it 
would be very difficult to motivate these member 
states to remain current on almost half of their 
debt stock in a severe economic crisis, in order to 
preserve the interest of their European partners. 
As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa put it, the euro is 
“a currency without a state”. The euro area is not 
a nation state with a federal government and a 
federal treasury; it is a group of sovereign coun-
tries. This implies that the budget prerogative 
rests with national parliaments, and national 
parliament will act based on national interest. 
National parliaments have the power to 
repudiate national debt, in full or in part. From a 
constitutional point of view, it is very difficult for 
the European Union or the Eurogroup to infringe 
with this national prerogative. From the realpolitik 
perspective, there are many examples of the 
failure of attempts by the Union to interfere with 
fiscal policies of member states: 
•  Germany and France broke the 3% ceiling on 
fiscal deficits in 2003, but no sanctions were 
imposed.  
•  Greece underreported its fiscal deficit every 
single year, since 2000, and only corrected the 
numbers with long delays (Ophranidis, 2010) 
– and there was nothing the European 
Commission could do about it.  
•  When the European Commission argued in 
favour of structural reforms and asset sales in 
the second review of the assistance 
programme for Greece in February 2011, the 
government reacted with hostility, stating 
that “the behaviour of EU, IMF and ECB 
officials was unacceptable. We asked nobody 
to interfere in domestic affairs … We only 
take orders from the Greek people.” 
This constitutional and political setting implies 
that the Stability and Growth Pact is incompatible 
with the nature of European Union. Member 
states will be happy ex ante to agree on rules and 
sanctions, but it will be impossible to enforce 
these sanctions, because of the budget 
prerogative of national parliaments. There is a 
broad understanding of this problem by now, 
which explains the desire to effectively replace 
the Stability and Growth Pact with national fiscal 
rules that are founded in member states’ 
constitutions.  
This setting also implies that a mutual guarantee 
for the public debt of member countries is 
incompatible with the nature of European Union. 
Neither the Union nor individual member states 
have the constitutional or political power to 
prevent fiscally challenged states from defaulting 
on “Blue Bonds” in times of crisis, and from 
turning them into direct obligations of the 
guarantors, i.e. the fiscally prudent countries that 
chose to avoid sovereign default.  
In sum, we can conclude that a liability split into 
senior “Blue Bonds” with a joint and several 
guarantee of all euro area governments and 
junior “Red Bonds” could lower the aggregate 
borrowing cost of countries in the European 
periphery, but mainly because this construction 
would be based on an illusion of seniority that 
cannot be enforced in times of crisis. In the end, 
member countries that wish to remain current on 
their own obligations may end up having to pay 
for Portuguese, Greek or Irish sovereign debt.  
4.  Temporary liquidity assistance 
through multilateral funds is 
necessary 
We have seen in previous sections that fully 
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under the current constitutional setting of the 
European Union, and that a permanent pooling of 
funding through a liability split into “Blue 
Bonds” and “Red Bonds” would either create 
perverse incentives or drive fiscally challenged 
countries into immediate sovereign default. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude from 
this that sovereign debt markets should best be 
left to their own devices, as many German 
academics and politicians suggest.  
Under the fixed exchange rate regime with open 
capital accounts that characterises the euro area, 
sudden swings in creditor sentiment can lead to 
sovereign defaults even if a country’s public debt 
is sustainable in the medium term. Sovereign 
defaults are costly both for creditors and debtors, 
mainly because they typically go in hand with 
banking crises. The resulting breakdown in 
domestic financial intermediation can be quite 
harsh – as in the cases of Russia (1998) and 
Argentina (2001), where the chain of payment 
broke and households and firms partially 
reverted to barter. This led to a severe loss in 
output and employment, which lowered the 
country’s welfare and its capacity to repay 
sovereign debt. Yeyati and Panizza (2011) show 
that countries which become subject to elevated 
sovereign default risk typically suffer severe 
output contractions, independently of whether or 
not the government ultimately decides to validate 
the market’s anticipation of a default or not. The 
prospect of multilateral liquidity assistance for 
countries with sustainable sovereign debt burden 
can limit these avoidable output losses and 
thereby increase welfare. It can act as a catalyst to 
restore market confidence.  
This finding is consistent with the theoretical 
literature on sovereign debt crises. Calvo (1988) 
demonstrates in a simple model that the 
sovereign debt market is characterised by 
multiple equilibria. As long as interest rates 
remain reasonably low, governments with 
sustainable debt burdens maximise welfare by 
remaining current on their obligations. But a 
benevolent government would chose to 
(partially) repudiate its sovereign debt if the 
interest rate rises too much above the growth rate 
of the economy. The non-uniqueness of equilibria 
implies that investor expectations of rising 
default risk, which are articulated through 
elevated risk premia on sovereign debt, can 
become self-fulfilling. Small changes in market 
sentiment can drive a solvent country into 
default. Due to the costs of debt repudiation, this 
solution to the sovereign debt crisis is a pareto-
inferior ‘bad equilibrium’. It follows from this 
model that an international lender of last resort 
can help to steer market expectations towards a 
‘good equilibrium’ – provided, however, that the 
sovereign’s debt is indeed sustainable. Morris 
and Shin (2006) present a game-theoretical model 
of sovereign debt crises with three actors: the 
debtor country, private creditors, and an 
international lender of last resort. If the 
sovereign’s cash holdings are smaller than the 
sum of interest payments and maturing debt in 
any one period, then “the fate of the country lies 
in the hand of its short term creditors”, even if the 
sovereign is fundamentally sound. For annual 
periods, this is the case for all member states of 
the euro area. The inefficient outcome of a 
sovereign default can be avoided if an 
international lender of last resort provides 
liquidity assistance – provided, however, that the 
sovereign reacts to financial crisis and 
multilateral intervention with an increased 
macroeconomic adjustment effort. The 
sovereign’s increased effort, in turn, alters the 
incentives among private creditors and induces a 
debt rollover.  
In her analysis of Germany’s banking crisis and 
sovereign default of 1931, Schnabel (2004) 
concludes that “only an ‘international lender of 
last resort’ could have provided the ‘liquidity’ 
(foreign currency) needed to prevent the German 
collapse”. This is precisely the reason why the 
IMF was created in 1944: in a system of fixed 
exchange rates, there is a need for an institution 
capable of providing emergency funding when 
capital markets seize up. The European Union 
today needs a similar institution; an international 
lender of last resort to provide liquidity assistance 
to governments of solvent countries that lose 
market access, as suggested by Gros and Mayer 
(2010).  
Haufler et al. (2011) disaffirm the need for a 
permanent facility to support countries facing 
liquidity crises. They believe that “states that 
need the rescue fund because their creditors are 
not convinced that they merely face a liquidity 
bottleneck must then be considered insolvent.” 
As shown above, equating illiquidity with 
insolvency ignores key findings of the theoretical 
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creditor expectations and creditor coordination 
failures can drive solvent sovereign borrowers 
into a default on their obligations, especially if 
these obligations are denominated in a currency 
that that sovereign does not control. Furthermore, 
there is ample empirical evidence on 
interventions of international lenders of last 
resort in sovereign debt markets that have 
successfully prevented liquidity problems from 
turning into solvency crises: the joint assistance of 
the IMF and the US Treasury to Mexico in 1995, 
the IMF programme for Turkey in 2002, the joint 
EU-IMF assistance programmes for Hungary, 
Latvia and Romania in 2008, to name but a few. 
In all of these cases, the recipients of multilateral 
liquidity assistance were able to regain market 
access and remain current on their debt without 
having to resort to sovereign defaults. Romania 
had gross general government debt of 21.3% of 
GDP (IMF 2010c) when it was hit by contagion 
from the global financial crisis in 2008 and had to 
request multilateral liquidity assistance to avoid a 
sovereign default. Arguing that this request for 
liquidity assistance automatically implies that the 
country “must then be considered insolvent” 
without giving consideration to fundamentals, as 
Haufler at al. suggest, is bordering on the 
ridiculous. By turning a blind eye to theoretical 
findings and empirical evidence, the authors are 
following the example of the Bank of England, 
which denied liquidity assistance to the German 
Reichsbank in 1931 and thereby contributed to 
the most devastating sovereign default and 
banking crisis that shook Germany in the past 
century. 
This is not to say that sovereign debt 
restructuring should be avoided at all times. But 
the empirical evidence suggests a limited need to 
complement liquidity assistance with haircuts on 
private creditors in order to overcome fiscal and 
balance of payment crises. Bini Smaghi (2010) 
calculated that out of 113 IMF support 
programmes over the last 20 years, only 19 
countries defaulted or restructured their debts. 
Others have argued that European countries 
should leave the task of providing emergency 
assistance to the IMF instead of setting up their 
own lender of last resort. However, the sums 
involved in backstopping euro area sovereign 
issuers far exceed the lending capacity of the IMF. 
This can be illustrated by taking a closer look at 
the public sector borrowing requirements in 
various European countries. 
One of the key lessons from the crises in Asia and 
in Argentina is that multilateral financial 
assistance in the context of a fiscal adjustment 
programme needs to be sufficiently large to take 
the country out of the market for two or three 
years – otherwise, the intervention will likely lack 
credibility. Emergency funding in fiscal crises 
aims to remove the tail risk that a solvent country 
has to default on its sovereign debt because it 
runs out of cash. As long as this tail risk persists, 
it can be rational for investors to stop refinancing 
solvent countries, to sell down their exposure or 
to put on “short” positions, because the value of 
these claims will decline further as the sovereign 
moves closer to a default. If international 
liquidity assistance is provided at small scale, 
then these funds will likely end up being used to 
finance capital flight only, as in the cases of 
Russia in 1998 or Argentina in 2001. Only 
programmes that cover the sovereign’s gross 
financing requirements well in excess of one year 
will be large enough to contribute to a 
meaningful reversal of private capital flows. Such 
a programme has the potential to remove the tail 
risk of an unnecessary default, and thereby 
induce the private sector to resume lending to 
and investing in the country. For the countries of 
the euro area, the IMF is unable to provide the 
needed liquidity assistance on its own. IMF 
stand-by arrangements are typically capped at 
500% of quota. In the case of Greece, the IMF took 
the exceptional step of providing €30 billion, 
which amounts of 3,200% of quota. At present, 
five out of 27 member states of the European 
Union have obtained credit from the IMF. Table 1 
shows that the total size of IMF commitments to 
these countries is within a range of 10% to 14% of 
GDP. The total size of multilateral assistance 
programmes has varied between 16% and 48% of 
GDP, and co-financing through the European 
Union, the euro area or other lenders has 
amounted to 35% to 77% of the total programme 
volume. Programmes have been sized to cover 
the government’s gross financing requirement for 
eighteen months to three years. The Latvia 
programme went significantly beyond this 
metric, as it was primarily a balance of payments 
assistance programmes meant to smooth the 
adjustment of the excessive current account 
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Table 1. Actual and potential assistance programmes in the European Union 
 
Sources: IMF, European Commission, Bloomberg, author’s calculations. 
Note: SDR are converted into EUR using an exchange rate of 1.13. Three-year financing requirements are calculated from the 
(assumed) programme inception onwards: 2009-2011 for Hungary, Latvia and Romania, 2010-2012 for Greece, 2011-2013 for 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. For existing programmes, GFR are taken from various IMF staff reports. For potential programmes, 
GFR are calculated based on Bloomberg data on debt maturities and on government deficit targets under the excessive deficit 
procedure of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. 
The table also shows that under reasonable 
assumptions, existing funds in the different 
assistance facilities are barely sufficient to 
backstop Portugal and Spain, if needed. The EFSF 
can borrow up to €255 billion while maintaining 
its AAA rating and the EFSM can borrow up to 
€60 billion. €40 billion of these funds have already 
been committed to Ireland, which leaves €275 
billion in available lending capacity. If we assume 
that IMF commitments to Portugal and Spain 
would be capped at 14% of GDP, then the 
European financial assistance could be 
complemented by €171 billion in IMF credit, for a 
total assistance volume of €446 billion. A credible 
multilateral intervention should cover around 
80% of the cumulative gross financing 
requirement of the public sector in the first three 
years of the programme, which would amount to 
€410 billion for Portugal and Spain combined.  
In sum, an institution to provide temporary 
liquidity assistance is a necessary addition to the 
institutional framework of EMU. This role cannot 
be assumed by the IMF alone, due to the size of 
the necessary interventions. There is a need for a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF), as suggested by 
Gros and Mayer (2010), to complement the 
European Central Bank.  
5.  Loans from a European Monetary 
Fund need to be senior to market debt 
In the previous section, we have not covered the 
most common objection against multilateral 
emergency funding to sovereign borrowers: this 
liquidity assistance is said to create ‘moral 
hazard’ in the sense that it induces governments 
to borrow beyond their sustainable debt level, 
because they expect that they (or rather, their 
private creditors) would be ‘bailed out’ by 
multilateral lenders if markets seize.  
It is clear that any insurance mechanism is prone 
to moral hazard. The only way to fully eliminate 
moral hazard in multilateral lending to 
sovereigns would be to stop providing such 
insurance against market seizure. This, however, 
would imply that euro area governments should 
hold no public debt at all. Experience with 
countries that borrow in a currency they cannot 
control has shown that markets can seize up for 
reasons that are unrelated to a country’s 
fundamentals (such as occurred during the 
Russian crisis of 1998 or the global financial crisis 
of 2008) and that markets can drive into default 
sovereign issuers that have perfectly sustainable 
debt levels. An example of this is the case of 
Existing programmes Potential programmes
in € billions, unless noted otherwise Hungary Latvia Romania Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
IMF quota 1.2 0.1 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 3.4
2010 GDP 98.4 17.8 121.7 229.9 156.5 171.4 1051.3
Three‐year cumulative public sector financing requirements, from programme inception onwards
Principal amortisations 42.1 0.3 4.3 97.2 62.9 46.3 288.5
Projected net borrowing 5.9 2.3 13.3 73.4 42.4 21.0 157.1
Gross financing requirement (GFR) 48.0 2.5 17.6 170.6 105.3 67.3 445.6
(Potential) IMF credit 12.5 1.7 12.9 30.0 22.5 24.0 147.2
(Potential) IMF credit, in % of quota 1065% 1186% 1108% 3226% 2375% 2448% 4272%
(Potential) IMF credit, in % of 2010 GDP 13% 10% 11% 13% 14% 14% 14%  
EU co‐financing 6.5 3.1 5.0 80.0 40.2 29.8 209.3
Other co‐financing 1.0 2.7 2.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0
Total programme 20.0 7.5 19.9 110.0 67.5 53.8 356.5
Co‐financing, in % of total programme 38% 77% 35% 73% 67% 55% 59%  
Total programme, in % of GDP 20% 42% 16% 48% 43% 31% 34%
Total programme, in % of public sector GFR 42% 295% 113% 64% 64% 80% 80%RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE EURO AREA | 13 
 
Romania, which lost market access in 2008, 
although it had government debt of merely 21.3% 
of GDP. In the two-period model of Morris and 
Shin (2006), the market can drive a sovereign into 
default if its cash holdings are smaller than the 
sum of interest payments and maturing debt in 
any one period. Extending this game-theoretical 
exercise beyond two periods would show that a 
sovereign which is borrowing in a currency it 
does not control needs to hold cash well in excess 
of its gross financing requirement for one year in 
order to be protected against market seizure. This 
raises the question of why such a government 
should borrow at all, since holding 40% or 50% of 
its credits in cash reserves would most certainly 
render any borrowing uneconomical. Indeed, the 
result of the sovereign defaults of US states in the 
1840s was that most states stopped borrowing in 
meaningful size, and that most state constitutions 
now require balanced cash budgets. The absence 
of a robust international lender of last resort in 
the Asian crisis of 1997 led to a massive 
accumulation of international reserves which has 
turned almost all Asian sovereigns from net 
debtors into net creditors. Opponents of 
insurance mechanisms to protect euro area 
member states against market seizure implicitly 
argue that these countries should have no public 
debt at all. If, however, euro area member states 
are unable to borrow and there is no meaningful 
federal budget at the level of the European Union, 
then macroeconomic volatility should be 
expected to rise significantly, as governments are 
no longer in a position to smooth aggregate 
demand over time. This problem is exacerbated 
by the fact that monetary policy in the euro area 
cannot be expected to react to asymmetric shocks 
that hit individual member countries. Rising 
macroeconomic volatility due to inadequate fiscal 
and monetary policy responses to fluctuations in 
output is associated with welfare losses. There are 
three options to avoid such welfare losses:  
i)  EMU breaks up and member states revert to 
a situation in which they are able to borrow 
in a currency they can control,  
ii)  EMU is transformed into a full transfer union 
comparable to the USA, where member states 
don’t borrow and hold no debt, but a large 
portion of overall taxes flow to the federal 
government, which issues debt to smooth 
aggregate demand,  
iii)  EMU member states keep their sovereign 
debt, and an insurance mechanism is put into 
place to protect them against market seizure.  
If member states of the euro area indeed opt to set 
up a European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a joint 
insurance mechanism against market seizure, 
then they should look at ways of reducing moral 
hazard within this institutional framework, 
instead of embarking on the elusive quest of 
eliminating moral hazard altogether. The best 
way to minimize moral hazard in multilateral 
lending to sovereigns is to insist on seniority over 
market debt.  
Countries can lose market access for two reasons: 
market failure could lead to a liquidity crisis, or 
excessive debt could lead to a solvency crisis. This 
leads to a dilemma for multilateral lenders: it is 
difficult to tell these two types of crises apart 
when markets seize. The sustainable debt burden 
of a sovereign is not clearly defined, and liquidity 
crises can turn into solvency crises when high 
market interest rates result in prohibitive debt 
servicing costs, as explained by Calvo (1988). 
However, emergency funding through an 
international lender of last resort can only be 
justified in the context of market failure and a 
liquidity crisis. If there is no market failure, then 
there is no reason for public interventions in 
financial markets. Emergency funding that is 
provided to a solvent lender can act as a catalyst 
to re-start private lending and thereby help to 
steer the market to a ‘good equilibrium’. 
However, emergency funding provided to a 
country which is actually facing a solvency 
problem that has been correctly diagnosed by 
market participants will only serve to bail out 
reckless lenders.  
Fortunately, there is a way out of this dilemma: 
seniority of multilateral lending. The IMF 
typically provides emergency funding in limited 
size, for a limited time and at concessional terms. 
If the country manages to regain market access 
after being granted liquidity assistance and pays 
back its multilateral credits, then this is a sign that 
it was only facing a surmountable liquidity crisis. 
If the country fails to regain market access, then 
this is a signal that it was facing a solvency crisis 
and has to bring down its debt overhang. In that 
case, IMF seniority will prevent a waste of the 
lenders’ resources. Seniority of funding is 
instrumental in preventing moral hazard by 
limiting the risks for the multilateral lender: IMF 14 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
programmes to Russia, Argentina, Uruguay, etc. 
have created no costs to the international 
community because IMF loans have been repaid 
in full in all of these cases, in spite of the parallel 
restructurings of private sector debt (Jeanne and 
Zettelmeyer, 2006).  
Basic welfare economics dictates that multilateral 
liquidity assistance needs to come at non-market, 
i.e. concessional lending rates. A multilateral 
institution that provides liquidity assistance at 
market rates, as suggested recently by Weber 
(2011), should not lend at all. If market rates are 
affordable to the sovereign, then lending should 
be left to markets. Multilateral institutions should 
only intervene when there are signs of a failure of 
financial markets, i.e. when there is a temporary 
overshooting in market risk premia that could 
lead to a self-reinforcing sovereign debt crisis. In 
turn, it is clear that seniority of multilateral 
financial assistance is a pre-requisite for 
concessional lending rates. To quote Nouriel 
Roubini and Brad Setser:  
The IMF is not as a private lender seeking 
profitable lending opportunities but a public 
institution responsible for stabilizing the 
international financial system. … The IMF’s 
preferred status lets it lend when private creditors 
will not, even though it has to guard against 
losing the taxpayers’ funds it manages. … 
Without effective seniority, the IMF would have 
to act more like a private lender … It would need 
to lend to a sovereign at high market rates in 
order to avoid systematically losing money and 
would be less able to put money in when other 
creditors are pulling out. (Roubini and Setser 
2004, p. 253f.). 
Gros (2010) has argued convincingly that the 
presence of multilateral debt with preferred 
creditor status puts private creditors into a more 
junior position, which raises the required risk 
premium for private debt. Daniel Gros also 
believes that this would prevent the country from 
regaining market access. We have shown in the 
discussion of the “Blue Bond” proposal in section 
3 of this paper that this may indeed be the case, if 
senior financing is very large, as a share of GDP 
or as a share of the sovereign’s total stock of debt. 
This shows how important it is to size assistance 
programmes correctly: they need to be large 
enough to be credible and act as a catalyst to re-
start private lending, and they need to be small 
enough to encourage continued private lending at 
reasonable rates. However, experience has shown 
that it is possible to strike the right balance. In 
fact, there is no empirical evidence that IMF 
seniority has stopped private creditors from 
providing new money to solvent sovereigns that 
were recipients of multilateral funds over the past 
twenty years or so. Brazil, Turkey, Ukraine, etc. 
were all able to raise money in the market after 
the IMF stepped in to provide liquidity 
assistance. Hungary, Latvia and Romania were all 
able to raise new money in the primary market, in 
spite of the explicit seniority of loans that these 
countries received from the IMF and through the 
EU’s balance of payments assistance facility 
under Article 143, TFEU (EU 2009).  
If we were to face a situation in Europe in which 
seniority of funding provided by multilateral 
lenders of last resort would make it impossible 
for a sovereign to raise new money in the primary 
market on a permanent basis, then this should be 
seen as a signal of debt overhang. In that case, the 
solution is not to provide multilateral funding on 
equal terms with private creditors, but to 
restructure the sovereign debt and to let the 
private sector take a hit. 
6.  Debt buybacks at market prices  
could make sense for Spain 
We have established that provisions for 
temporary liquidity assistance through a 
multilateral lender of last resort are a necessary 
addition to the institutional framework of the 
European Monetary Union. This raises the 
question whether temporary liquidity assistance 
s h o u l d  o n l y  b e  u s e d  t o  r e p a y  m a t u r i n g  p r i v a t e  
debt at par, or whether governments should be 
enabled to buy back their own debt in the 
secondary markets, if it is trading at a significant 
discount to par. After all, such buybacks would 
allow a certain amount of debt relief.  
Buybacks at a discount have been a regular 
feature in past sovereign debt crises. For instance, 
the German government bought back a 
significant portion of its non-performing 
sovereign debt in the market after the 1931 
default. Many Latin American countries bought 
back performing and non-performing debt 
throughout the 1980s, or exchanged it into 
physical assets. With hindsight, these operations 
were insufficient to deal with the sovereign debt 
overhang these countries were facing, and did not 
result in a re-activation of international lending. 
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buyback operations in the early 1990s. 
Commercial bank creditors were given the choice 
to convert their existing Philippine sovereign 
bonds into Brady bonds or to tender them for 
cash, at 52% of face (Chemical Bank, 1992). The 
options were calibrated to achieve identical net 
present value. Buybacks were largely financed by 
new loans from the World Bank and the IMF. 
Documents retained by Citibank show that the 
Philippine sovereign debt restructuring achieved 
a participation rate of 96% of outstanding debt. 
Holders of 27% of eligible debt chose the buyback 
option, and holders of 69% of eligible debt opted 
for an exchange into new sovereign obligations. 
Sovereign spreads quickly receded once the debt 
restructuring was completed. 
Debt only trades at a significant discount to par if 
creditors assign a high probability to non-
payment. If countries retire debt at a discount 
they won’t have to pay back the full amount of 
their borrowing at maturity, even if they do 
remain current on their obligations. Krugman 
(1988) shows in a simple model that sovereign 
debt buybacks at a discount reduce the expected 
total payments to all creditors, as they deprive 
creditors of the option value of full repayment. As 
a result, “the country gains at creditors’ expense”. 
Krugman concludes that creditors will typically 
not allow buybacks, unless they assign a very low 
option value to full repayment because they are 
convinced that the country will default anyway. 
In that case, a debt restructuring may be more 
straightforward. Krugman’s model may explain 
why debtors have often been prohibited from 
repurchasing their own obligations at a discount 
under sovereign loan and bond documentation. 
But in the European case, there are no legal 
impediments against sovereign debt buybacks – 
in fact, the governments of Hungary and Portugal 
have carried out several buyback operations in 
recent months to restore market order. In a 
narrow sense, governments may have gained at 
creditors’ expenses from these buybacks, as 
Krugman suggests. But in a broader sense, 
buybacks may have been pareto-efficient, as they 
have helped to prevent an overshooting of market 
risk premia. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1988) argue that sovereign 
debt can only be bought back at a significant 
discount when the country’s actual payment 
capacity is very low. In that case, the country 
would likely have alternative uses of its scarce 
resources that have a higher value for it than debt 
repurchases. Dornbusch (1988) criticises that this 
cost-benefit analysis “oversimplifies the issue”. If 
additional resources are made available to a 
distressed sovereign borrower that are earmarked 
for market-based debt reductions, then the 
country should clearly take advantage of the fact 
that its debt is trading at a discount to par and 
repurchase it from creditors, in order to benefit 
from lower total debt servicing costs. Bulow and 
Rogoff acknowledge this criticism by giving 
qualified support for market-based debt 
reduction schemes: “for a buyback to make sense 
for a country, it must ... receive incremental new 
loans and grants to cover part of the cost.”  
We conclude that debt buybacks at market prices 
make sense for solvent borrowers that have been 
given access to additional resources to carry out 
these operations.  
Under current circumstances, this may be of 
particular relevance for the Spanish sovereign, 
which appears to be solvent according to most 
metrics. The Spanish government bond market 
has been hit by contagion from the escalating 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece, as Figure 5 
demonstrates. Based on Granger-causality tests, it 
can be shown that the widening of Spanish 
sovereign bond spreads that occurred in early 
2010 has largely been driven by the CDS market 
(Fontana and Scheicher, 2010). This is an indicator 
for a speculative attack by leveraged investors. 
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
hedge funds generated handsome profits from 
short positions in Spanish sovereign debt during 
2009 and 2010. Price signals in the CDS market 
have fed through to the government bond 
market, and seem to have triggered an exodus of 
mutual funds, pension funds and insurance 
companies from Spain. According to proprietary 
flow data from European investment banks, the 
retreat of international investors accelerated 
sharply during the fourth quarter of 2010. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that major European 
institutional investors have underweighted Spain 
vis-à-vis their benchmarks, if they hold any 
positions at all. Initially, this investor positioning 
does not necessarily reflect a view on the 
solvency of the Spanish government. Instead, it 
can be rational to ‘short’ Spain, outright or 
against a benchmark, if investors expect others to 
sell as well. The seminal paper on this type of 
noise trading cites Keynes to illustrate this point:  16 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
Investment based on genuine long-term expec-
tation is so difficult ... as to be scarcely practicable. 
He who attempts it must surely ... run greater 
risks than he who tries to guess better than the 




Figure 5. Custodial bond flows, 2007 – June 2010, as percent of 2010 general government debt 
 
Source: IMF (2010b), Figure 1.9. 
Investor re-positioning and the resulting changes 
in borrowing rates are necessary components of 
well-functioning sovereign debt markets. 
However, under a fixed exchange rate regime 
with open capital accounts, a speculative attack 
on a government bond market can lead to a self-
reinforcing sovereign debt crisis. In such 
circumstances, there is a case for sovereign debt 
buybacks to prevent the market from becoming a 
one-way street. Buybacks at a discount to par 
would be beneficial for the issuer, and they could 
help restore market order, in a similar way to 
automatic ‘circuit breakers’ that have been 
established by many stock exchanges.  
At present, European policy-makers have 
delegated the task of stabilising government debt 
markets to the ECB. However, the Securities 
Markets Programme brings the ECB dangerously 
close to monetising government debt, as Weber 
(2010) and others have rightly criticised. Instead, 
giving a solvent country like Spain access to EFSF 
funds of €50 billion or €100 billion to buy back its 
own government debt in the market would allow 
the ECB to disengage from quasi-fiscal policy. 
Expectations of such large-scale asset purchases 
have already deterred speculators and 
contributed to a meaningful tightening of Spanish 
sovereign spreads and to a lowering of auction 
yields in the first weeks of 2011.  
In sum, allowing the EFSF to finance sovereign 
debt buybacks of solvent euro area member 
countries could mark the turning point in the 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
7.  Greece should undertake a debt 
exchange at non-market prices 
For solvent countries, sovereign bond buybacks 
can serve to restore market order. Beyond this 
function, buybacks have been proposed as a 
means of eliminating the debt overhang that 
some countries in the periphery of the euro area 
may be facing.  
Gros and Mayer (2011) have proposed such a 
market-based debt reduction scheme for euro 
area member states that are insolvent according 
to most metrics, such as Greece. In the first stage 
of their concept, private creditors would be 
allowed to exchange Greek government bonds 
into EFSF obligations at market prices. In order to 
be able to harvest the full market-implied debt 
reduction, this swap offer would be based on 
market prices that prevailed prior to the 
announcement of the debt management exercise. 
The EFSF would then sell its holdings of Greek 
bonds on to the sovereign, and provide it with 
credit at concessional terms to finance the 
buyback. As a result, the EFSF would become the 
main lender to Greece, and private creditors RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE EURO AREA | 17 
 
would have been given an exit, at a market-based 
discount to par.  
Several objections have been raised against this 
proposal for “debt reduction without default”. 
Most notably, the Bundesbank (2011) warns that 
debt buybacks in the secondary market may be 
insufficient to restore fiscal sustainability for euro 
area governments, because markets are not 
pricing in a steep enough discount to par value. 
In the case of Greece, this criticism appears to be 
valid.  
Table 2 shows the economics of a debt buyback 
according to the mechanism proposed by Gros 
and Mayer (2011). The current stock of Greece’s 
bonded debt amounts to €285.7 billion face value, 
and bonds traded at a market-cap weighted 
average price of 77.5% in February 2011. The 
average coupon rate that Greece pays on this debt 
is 4.26%, and the annual interest bill on this 
portion of public debt is €12.2 billion. In order to 
buy up all bonded Greek public debt at current 
market prices, the EFSF would have to spend 
€221.5 billion (plus accrued interest). The EFSF 
can then sell these bonds on to Greece and 
provide Greece with a credit of €221.5 billion to 
finance the buyback. The EFSF is currently 
funding itself at a spread of eight basis points 
over euro swaps. Ten-year euro swaps are 
currently trading at 3.52%. Because of over-
collateralisation and cash reserve requirements, 
the EFSF would be able to provide Greece with 
ten-year loans at a minimum rate of roughly 
4.00%. If a debt exchange were carried out under 
these parameters, then Greece would henceforth 
only face the EFSF as a creditor, apart from the 
emergency loans provided by other euro area 
governments and the ECB. Greece would have an 
annual interest bill of €8.9 billion on its stock of 
EFSF debt, provided that the debt exchange 
achieves a participation rate of 100%. This implies 
that such a market-based debt reduction would 
lower Greece’s annual public debt service by a 
maximum of 23%, and take it to around 5.0% of 
GDP.  
Table 2. A market-based restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt 
in € billions, unless otherwise noted  Today Post restructuring
Stock of bonded debt  285.71 221.48
Average coupon rate  4.26% 4.00%
Average bond price  77.5%
2011 interest payments on bonded debt  12.18 8.86
2011 interest payments on IMF and bilateral loans  2.38 2.38
2011 total interest payments on public debt  14.56 11.24
2011 debt service, in % of GDP  6.5% 5.0%
Change in debt service  -23%
Sources: Bloomberg, author’s calculations 
Note: This calculation is based on instrument-level data on 7 T-Bill issues (€8 billion total notional), 46 domestic bonds  
(€258 billion total notional) and 29 bonds issued under international law (€19 billion total notional). Bond prices are based  
on closing levels as of 2 February 2011. Debt service on IMF and EU loans is estimated based on IMF data.  
With this result at hand, we can ask whether a 
market-based debt reduction scheme would 
likely be sufficient to restore debt sustainability 
for Greece. Figure 6 provides a cross-sectional 
view of the public debt service of major 
economies. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
government of an advanced economy can sustain 
a debt service of around 4% of GDP. This is what 
Turkey is paying today and has been paying on 
average over the past decade. In order to service 
its current stock of debt, the Greek government 
will have to pay interest of 6.5% of GDP in 2011, 
and this burden is projected to increase further in 
the years ahead. Combined with the fact that 
most of Greece’s public debt is held by non-resi-
dent investors, this appears to be unsustainable. 
A market-based debt reduction could potentially 
lower Greece’s public debt service to around 5.0% 
of GDP, and it would at best take Greece’s public 
debt burden to around 134% of GDP by the end 18 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
of 2011. As the country would still be running a 
substantial current account deficit, this amount of 
debt reduction would seem to be insufficient to 
restore investors’ confidence in the sustainability 
of Greece’s public finances. Investors would 
continue to demand elevated risk premia for 
Greek government bonds in the primary market, 
and the associated borrowing rates would lead to 
a snowballing of Greece’s debt servicing costs in 
the years ahead.  
Figure 6. Government debt affordability (projections for 2011) 
 
Sources: IMF, Moody’s, author’s calculations. 
Gros and Mayer (2011) acknowledge that a 
voluntary exchange of government bonds into 
EFSF debt may be insufficient to restore debt 
sustainability, as the market discount is too small. 
In that case, they propose that the EFSF would 
charge Greece a lower interest rate, in return for 
the issuance of GDP warrants that would allow 
the EFSF to participate in a better-than-expected 
future performance of the Greek economy. It 
would certainly be possible to calibrate the 
interest rate on multilateral loans in a way that 
results in a sustainable debt burden for Greece – 
for instance, taking the interest rate to 2% would 
lower Greece’s annual debt service on bonded 
public debt by 64%. Under this scenario, Greece 
would end up with public debt service of around 
3% of GDP, which should be a sufficient 
reduction under most plausible assumptions. 
However, allowing Greece to fund itself at such a 
concessional rate would result in a negative net 
interest margin for the EFSF or its successor 
institution, the ESM. This would most certainly 
trigger significant rating downgrades, and would 
make it impossible for the EFSF to raise sufficient 
funds in the market to provide Greece with loans 
to finance a bond buyback. Alternative 
mechanisms can be designed to provide Greece 
with concessional loans in order to carry out bond 
buybacks at market prices. But if such highly 
concessional loans are required in order to 
achieve a sustainable debt burden, then the 
international community will rightly ask why it 
should finance what is effectively a transfer 
payment to Greece’s private creditors. 
In sum, the relatively low discounts that the 
market applies to Greek government bonds 
effectively rule out a market-based debt reduction 
scheme along the lines of the proposal developed 
by Gros and Mayer (2011). However, these low 
discounts are not a binding constraint on a 
successful debt exchange. After all, current 
market prices on government bonds issued by 
countries in the periphery of the euro area are 
artificially high because of ECB purchases 
through the Securities Market Programme. 
Instead of starting with current market prices and 
then adjusting the EFSF funding rate down in 
order to achieve a sustainable debt burden for 
Greece, as Gros and Mayer suggest, we can start 
with a view on the sustainable debt burden for 
Greece, and then calculate the discount on 
government bonds that is required to achieve this 
debt burden.  
If we assume that Greece can afford to pay 
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most plausible scenarios and that nominal GDP 
will reach around €224 billion this year, then we 
can set the sustainable total public debt service at 
€7.84 billion, which is 46% below the current 
level. Interest payments on IMF loans will likely 
amount to around €0.44 billion in 2011 which 
leaves roughly €7.40 billion in payment capacity 
on other public debt. At a coupon rate of 4%, this 
payment capacity can sustain a debt stock of €185 
billion face value of private sector and bilateral 
debt. Table 3 gives a summary of this calculation. 
Table 3. A restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt at below-market prices 
in € billions, unless otherwise noted  Today Post restructuring
Stock of bonded debt  285.71 185.00
Average coupon rate  4.26% 4.00%
Stock of bilateral loans  32.08 nil
2011 interest payments on bonded debt  12.18 7.40
2011 interest payments on bilateral loans  1.94 nil
2011 interest payments on IMF loans  0.44 0.44
2011 total interest payments on public debt 14.56 7.84
2011 debt service, in % of GDP  6.5% 3.5%
Change in debt service  -46%
Sources: Author’s calculations. 
Note: This calculation assumes that bilateral loans provided by member states of the euro area under  
the inter-creditor agreement of May 2010 are restructured into new Greek government bonds.  
In order to reduce its current stock of bonded 
debt and bilateral loans to a sustainable level of 
around €185 billion, the government of Greece 
could make a voluntary exchange offer. Holders 
of government bonds could be given a menu of 
three options:  
i)  Discount bond option: Holders can choose 
to exchange every €1.00 million face of 
existing bonds into €0.58 million face of new 
bonds, with a coupon rate of 4% and a 
maturity of 20 years. At an exit yield of 6%, 
these bonds would have a market value of 
€0.45 million. Holders should be offered 
complimentary GDP warrants with a market 
value of around €0.10 million for every €1.00 
million tendered. These GDP warrants would 
allow them to participate in a better-than-
expected future performance of the Greek 
economy, as suggested by Gros and Mayer. 
ii)  Par bond option: Holders can choose to 
exchange every €1.00 million face of existing 
bonds into €1.00 million face of new bonds, 
with a coupon rate of 1.20% and a maturity 
of 20 years. At an exit yield of 6%, these 
bonds would have a market value of €0.45 
million as well. Participating holders should 
also be offered complimentary GDP options 
worth €0.10 million. The par bond option 
should be particularly attractive to 
commercial banks that are holding Greek 
government bonds in their banking books, 
where these instruments are not subject to 
mark-to-market requirements. 
iii)  Buyback option: Holders can choose to sell 
their existing bonds to the EFSF at a price of 
45% of face value. The EFSF would then sell 
the bonds on to the Greek government and 
provide it with credit to finance the debt buy-
back, as proposed by Gros and Mayer. 
Holders who decide voluntarily to sell their 
bonds in this cash tender should not be 
offered GDP warrants; instead, these 
instruments should be issued to the EFSF.  
The above proposal is very similar to the 
sovereign debt restructuring undertaken by the 
Philippines in 1992, which was discussed in 
section 6 of this paper. There are two main 
differences between this approach and the 
market-based debt reduction scheme proposed by 
Gros and Mayer (2011): First, the buyback and 
exchange of existing debt would not be carried 
out at market prices, but at a discount that is 20 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
sufficient to restore public debt sustainability for 
Greece. Second, the design of the exchange offer 
would ensure that the large majority of private 
holders of Greek government bonds would likely 
choose to exchange their holdings into new 
obligations instead of tendering them for cash, in 
order to preserve the option value of 
participating in a future economic recovery of 
Greece. As a result, much of Greece’s debt should 
be expected to remain in private hands after the 
exchange. This outcome is preferable to a 
situation in which Greece would only borrow 
from the EFSF, the IMF and other euro area 
g o v e r n m e n t s ,  a s  p r o p o s e d  b y  G r o s  a n d  M a y e r  
(2010).  
The proposal is structured as a voluntary debt 
exchange at non-market prices, which raises the 
question how a high participation rate can be 
achieved. The member states of the euro area and 
the European institutions have several tools at 
hand to promote this outcome. First, there are 
currently €32 billion in bilateral loans outstanding 
which have been provided to Greece by the 
member states of the euro area under the Inter-
Creditor Agreement of May 2010. These medium-
term loans are relatively expensive for Greece. 
They rank on equal terms with market debt and 
should therefore also be exchanged into new 
long-term Par or Discount bonds at a lower 
interest rate. Second, the ECB has purchased 
around €50 billion face of Greek government 
bonds through the Securities Market Programme. 
These holdings should be exchanged into new 
Par and Discount bonds as well. Third, Greek 
commercial banks have currently pledged around 
€130 billion of bonds in refinancing transactions 
with the ECB. The great majority of these assets 
are government bonds. The ECB could decide to 
accept only new Greek Par and Discount bonds as 
eligible collateral in refinancing operations, which 
would provide commercial banks with a very 
strong incentive to voluntarily exchange their 
holdings of Greek government bonds into new 
obligations. In sum, this should already ensure a 
participation rate of close to 60%. Furthermore, 
the Greek government could reserve the option of 
unilaterally changing the terms of all non-
tendered bonds, as described in the following 
section of this paper, without awarding GDP 
warrants to their holders. This should further 
motivate existing investors to exchange their 
bonds into new obligations. Finally, there is the 
change in relative liquidity after completion of 
the exchange: “hold-out” creditors would find 
that existing Greek government bonds have 
become extremely illiquid, while new Greek 
bonds would have much higher market liquidity. 
This is another incentive to agree on a voluntary 
exchange.  
In sum, a voluntary exchange as described above 
should be able to achieve a participation rate in 
excess of 90%. In a legal sense, a voluntary 
exchange that is not ex ante binding to all holders 
will likely not constitute a credit event under the 
terms of ISDA master agreements, and should not 
trigger sovereign CDS contracts. As a result, 
investors who have bought protection on Greece 
in the market for credit derivatives would not be 
able to benefit from this form of mutually-agreed 
debt reduction. Such an orderly and controlled 
approach would allow the Greek government to 
significantly reduce its interest burden while 
avoiding threats to financial stability that may be 
associated with a unilateral debt restructuring. 
Most importantly, restoring financial stability 
would allow the Greek private sector to get back 
to business and to put the physical and human 
endowment of the country to productive use. 
8.  Unilateral debt restructurings  
are possible, but not desirable 
A number of observers have categorically denied 
that it could be in the interest of the government 
of an advanced economy to restructure its 
government debt. If that were the case, there 
would be no need to derive orderly approaches to 
debt reduction. However, such arguments can 
easily be refuted. 
Cottarelli et al. (2010) argue that governments in 
the periphery of the euro area are currently 
running large primary deficits. These government 
deficits before interest payments need to be 
eliminated through fiscal tightening in any case. 
If a government running a primary deficit decides 
to default on its debt, it will be shut out from 
borrowing and will have to cover all non-interest 
expenditures through primary revenues. Thus, it 
makes no sense for governments with primary 
deficits to default. Cottarelli et al. go on to argue 
that it would also be irrational for these 
governments to restructure their debt once they 
have achieved primary balance, as “the needed 
adjustment in today’s advanced economies 
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restructuring, even with a sizable haircut”. They 
illustrate this point with a numerical example on 
Greece’s public debt. Based on the numbers 
presented by Cottarelli et al., Greece would run a 
primary balance (p) of -8.6% of GDP in 2010. 
Public debt (d) is projected to reach around 148% 
of GDP between 2011 and 2015 and we have seen 
in section 7 of this paper that it carries an average 
nominal interest rate (r) of around 4.3%. Cottarelli 
et al. implicitly assume nominal trend growth (g) 
of 0.5% in the coming years to derive an interest-
growth differential (r-g) of 3.8%. It can be shown 
that the debt-stabilizing primary balance (p*) is 
defined as the interest-growth differential, 
multiplied by the stock of debt (Blanchard, 1990) 
– in short, p* = d(r-g).  
Based on the parameters chosen by Cottarelli et 
al., this would mean that Greece has to achieve a 
primary surplus of 5.6% of GDP to stabilize its 
public debt. Therefore, Greece would be required 
to move from a 2010 primary deficit of 8.6% of 
GDP to a primary surplus of 5.6% of GDP – a 
total adjustment of 14.2% of GDP, which is quite 
unprecedented. Cottarelli et al. then argue that a 
debt restructuring with a ‘haircut’ of 50% would 
only reduce the debt-stabilizing primary surplus 
to 2.7% of GDP, which would still leave Greece 
with a cumulative fiscal adjustment need of 11.3% 
of GDP. The authors conclude that it would be 
irrational for a country such as Greece to restruc-
ture its public debt once it has gone through the 
pain of reducing its primary deficit to zero, as it 
would already have completed close to 80% of 
the needed adjustment to restore sustainability.  
Cottarelli et al. have mis-specified the parameters 
of their calculations: IMF staff expects Greece to 
reach a primary deficit of 2.4%, not 8.6% in 2010, 
and it is implausible to assume an interest-growth 
differential of 3.8% at the outset. Furthermore, 
their argument against debt restructuring is based 
on a fallacy: the authors assume that the interest 
rate that Greece would have to pay on its public 
debt is independent of the level of debt. This is 
clearly wrong: governments with a high debt 
burden run a greater risk of defaulting on their 
debt and therefore have to pay higher risk 
premia. After a ‘haircut’ of 50%, Greece’s public 
debt would fall from 148% to 74% of GDP 
according to the calculations of Cottarelli et al., 
and this would command a much lower interest 
rate. It has already been shown in Reinhart et al. 
(2003) that  
the interest rate a country must pay on its debt is 
an endogenous variable [in debt sustainability 
analysis], which depends, among other things, on 
the country’s debt-to-output (or debt-to-exports) 
ratio. Because the interest rate on debt to private 
creditors can rise very sharply with the level of 
debt, ... a trajectory that may seem marginally 
sustainable according to standard calculations 
may in fact be much more problematic.  
Furthermore, it can be shown empirically that 
lower levels of public debt go hand in hand with 
higher trend growth. In sum, lowering the level 
of public debt changes debt dynamics both by 
affecting the average interest rate (r) on the debt 
and the growth rate of the economy (g). Instead 
of facing an interest-growth differential of 3.8% at 
an elevated level of public debt, Greece could face 
an average nominal interest rate of 4% after a 
successful debt exchange, and a nominal trend 
growth rate of 3%. This would reduce the debt-
stabilizing primary surplus to around 1% of GDP, 
significantly below the 2.7% level suggested by a 
simplistic calculation. More importantly, keeping 
Greece’s public debt level at 148% and its public 
debt service above 6% of GDP would almost 
certainly make it impossible for the country to 
fund itself in the market going forward.  
Others have argued that sovereign debt 
restructuring would be too costly for advanced 
economies. While a breach of contract certainly 
carries economic costs because of damages to 
property rights and to the rule of law, it can be 
shown that most of the associated loss in output 
occurs anyway in a sovereign debt crisis, whether 
the sovereign ends up validating investor 
concerns by defaulting on its debt or not (Yeyati 
and Panizza, 2011).  
In sum, there may be situations in which a 
benevolent government should choose to 
restructure its sovereign debt, as suggested by the 
simple model in Calvo (1988).  
It has been argued by Gianviti et al. (2010) and 
others that it would be difficult for euro area 
sovereigns to undertake a unilateral debt 
restructuring because they would not know how 
to deal with the problem of non-consenting 
creditors. This is actually not the case. Euro area 
governments do not need elaborate “Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanisms” (SDRM) or 
“Collective Action Clauses” (CAC) to achieve 
very high participation rates in unilateral debt 
restructurings.  22 | CHRISTIAN KOPF 
 
Past sovereign debt restructuring exercises in 
‘emerging markets’ have suffered from free-
riding problems, as non-consenting creditors 
ended up being paid in full, at the expense of 
cooperative lenders. This was due to the fact that 
emerging markets’ sovereign debt has typically 
been issued under New York or English law, 
which made it impossible to render changes in 
the payment terms legally binding for all 
creditors. It was a minor problem, however. 
Based on a thorough review of past debt 
restructuring exercises, Panizza et al. (2009) 
conclude that proposals for an SDRM “can 
perhaps be criticized (with the benefit of 
hindsight) for having barked up the wrong tree – 
creditor coordination failures did not, in the end, 
turn out to be a significant impediment to the 
debt renegotiations of the 1998-2005 period.” In 
the European context, there is even less of a need 
for an SDRM, as almost all public debt has been 
issued under domestic law. 95% of all bonded 
Greek public debt is governed by Greek law and 
provides no contractual negotiation rights to 
creditors at all, as Box 1 shows. These instruments 
can be restructured unilaterally, as suggested by 
Buchheit and Gulati (2010), and there is nothing 
bondholders can do about it.  
We conclude that it would be both feasible and 
desirable for highly indebted euro area 
governments to restructure their sovereign debt 
unilaterally, if they fail to regain market access 
after several years. This would likely have 
unwelcome consequences for financial stability in 
the euro area. Such an outcome should be 
avoided through a creative and cooperative 
solution such as the debt exchange proposal 
developed in this paper. 
 
Box 1: Legal provisions on Greek domestic debt, compared to a typical Emerging Markets sovereign bond  
Negative Pledge 
Hungary:  “The Republic undertakes that, if it or the National Bank of Hungary creates or permits to subsist any 
Security Interest upon … their assets or revenues, present or future, … the Republic shall, at the time 
or prior thereto, secure equally and rateably therewith the obligations of the Republic under the 
Notes.” 
Greece:  “Negative Pledge: None.” 
Consequence:  Greece can pledge any state income to third parties, such as airport taxes or lottery income, and these 
income streams would not be available to holders of sovereign debt in the event of a restructuring. 
Cross default 
Hungary:  “If any of the following events occurs and is continuing: … (ii) Breach of other obligations: the 
Republic defaults in the performance or observance of any of its other obligations … then … all of the 
Notes may … be declared immediately due and payable.” 
Greece:  “Cross Default: None” 
Consequence:  Greece can undertake a selective default without triggering a restructuring of its stock of public debt. 
Governing Law 
Hungary:  “The Notes are governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with, English law. The Republic 
agrees for the benefit of the Note holders that the courts of England shall have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any suit, action or proceedings, and to settle any dispute or difference arising out of or in 
connection with the Notes … The Republic irrevocably waives any objection which it might now or 
hereafter have to the courts of England being nominated as the forum to hear and determine any 
Proceedings and to settle any Disputes, and agrees not to claim that any such court is not a 
convenient or appropriate forum.” 
Greece:  “Governing Law: Greek law.” 
Consequence:  Greece can dictate the conditions of a sovereign debt restructuring, and creditors will not be able to 
litigate in foreign courts or to freeze Greek assets abroad. 
 
Note: Excerpts from the prospectuses of Hungary 5.75% government bonds due 2018, issued in 2008  
(ISIN XS0369470397) and Greece 5.30% government bonds due 2026, issued in 2009 (ISIN GR0133004177). 
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